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I. INTRODUCTION
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is an essential infras-
tructure element, often termed “the glue that keeps the Internet
together”. Even in its current version 4 [1], BGP misses
essential security mechanisms that would allow to validate
routing information distributed through BGP in terms of its
authenticity and integrity. While mechanisms like BGPsec [2]
have been proposed many years ago, so far they have not found
widespread adoption and many experts believe they never will
due to their inherent complexity [3].
Incidents happening as early as 1997 like AS7007 [4] or
the more recent Pakistan YouTube hijack [5] illustrate the
problems stemming from BGP route information not being
integrity protected and authenticated. In today’s Internet, BGP
routing regularly gets manipulated by criminals or state actors
with the goal of seizing control of certain portions of address
space1 for criminal or other purposes.
To ensure a minimal level of protection, most Internet
service providers (ISPs) rely on heuristic filtering of routing
information advertised from neighboring autonomous systems
(AS). One approach is called Path Origin Validation where
an ISP tries to verify whether the AS advertising a certain IP
prefix is actually the legitimate owner of this prefix.
II. IRR AND RPKI
Currently, the goto-solution is filtering based on route-
objects in so-called Internet Routing Registries (IRR). IRRs
can be described as a decentralized and distributed database
of text objects regarding information on Internet resources.
Different organizations like regional registrars but also private
actors run such IRRs and allow participating ISPs to add so-
called route-objects to them. Essentially, a route-object is a text
record that includes an IPv4 or v6 prefix, an origin AS number,
and a creator plus optional descriptions. It expresses that the
listed AS can act as originator of this prefix in BGP routing,
thereby stating a routing-intention. In addition, IRRs can also
hold other objects to express routing policies of autonomous
systems. However, in most cases no authentication to create
objects is required. As we have investigated in our work, data
in such IRRs is often badly maintained and thereby IRRs only
hold data of questionable quality.
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [6, 7] offers
an alternative that is expected to provide better data quality.
1https://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2020-January/105672.html
It is based on X.509 certificates and a public-key infrastruc-
ture run by registrars and offers a cryptographically secured
way of distributing routing-intentions from a prefix-owner to
all participants in BGP-routing. Route Origin Authorizations
(ROAs) are the equivalent to IRR’s route objects and contain
information that links a prefix to an AS. Additionally they
contain the max-length that a prefix can be announced with.
In contrast to the IRRs, ROAs are only valid if they are signed
with the resource certificate of a party that is authorized to
advertise this prefix and thereby form a tangible link between
a resource-owner and the routing-intention. It is notable that
RPKI’s root of trust is hereby located within the Regional
Internet Registries (RIRs) that offer RPKI as part of their
services. In a future increment, IANA shall hold the root
certificate for the PKI. This separates RPKI from other PKIs
such as Web certification with its decentralized CAs. The
distribution of keys happens through the so called Trust
Anchor Locators (TALs) where the RIRs publish their key
repositories. ISPs can use information from route objects or
ROAs to determine their import policies, governing which
announcements they are willing to accept from their peers.
III. A COMPARATIVE STUDY FOR IRR AND RPKI
In our work, we asked the question about data quality and
coverage of the IP address space of the rather new RPKI
compared to the older IRR approach. Earlier works from 2015
and 2016 have come to differing conclusions regarding actual
RPKI deployment [8, 9].
To assess this, live Internet-routing is validated via RIPE’s
Routing Information Service (RIS) through a newly developed
analytics framework (see Figure 1) for routing data and the
results are then compared to IRRs yielding a metric of how
credible the information in either RPKI and IRRs is. As a
side-product it yields a framework capable of processing up
to 30.000 routing-messages per second and which we intend
to open-source soon2
Additionally the adoption of Route Origin Validation is as-
sessed by injecting own prefix information through a dedicated
test AS and verifying its dissemination through the Internet
using probes from the RIPE Atlas project.
As a first step, general statistics have been established to
describe the development of RPKI’s repository size and a
exponential increase in the amount of ROAs was noticeable.
2Live routing validation using RIS-Live and IRRs: https://bit.ly/2UqdCIH
Fig. 1: Architecture of the analysis-framework. The majority
of the work is done in the pre-processing consisting of a
library to parse route-objects and ROAs and storing them in
a Patricia-trie for efficient lookup [10]. Multiple tools use
the Validation/Analysis-library to validate routing-data from
different sources.
Interpolations show that RPKI will catch up in terms of
prefixes covered within approximately 10 years from now as
address-space holders adopt the technology.
To assess the quality of ROAs, we looked at the validation
of routing-tables using RPKI route origin validation (ROV).
What can be seen is that invalid routes are virtually non-
existent and the reason for them mainly were route-leaks and
typos in ROAs that eventually got fixed quickly while our
study was running. When looking at the valid announcements,
we see that most of the ROAs cover the announcement directly,
meaning that the received prefix is equal to the prefix in the
ROA. Since filtering needs to be as specific as possible to
provide adequate immunity to hijacks using de-aggregation
attacks [11], this gives rise to the assumptions that network-
operators are aware of that and create their ROAs according
to their routing-reality.
Having this in mind, IRRs were inspected for their quality
by using ROAs and comparing them to the route-objects and
to actual BGP routing tables. The findings are very clear:
IRRs have substantial quality-problems. Many route-objects
contradict ROAs: While the majority of unique prefix/origin-
as tuples are equally covered in both datasets (around 65%),
many route-objects contradict information in ROAs. This is
mostly due to outdated information present in the IRRs,
most prominently caused by RADB3 that caused 84% of all
conflicts. When validating the routing-tables against route-
objects, we see that almost 10 % of all routes are invalid
according to route-objects. Additionally many of the routes
are simply not covered by route-objects (around 13%). So not
3One of the major independent IRRs.
only are there many quality-problems in IRRs, but they don’t
even cover the whole announced address-space.
Wrapping up all results regarding the quality of ROAs vs
the quality of route-objects, it is clear that ROAs are by far
the better source of information.
Currently ROAs do not cover as much address-space as
route-objects, but even now roughly 20 % of all routes seen
on the Internet could be successfully validated. Looking at
invalids, we see far less RPKI-invalids than IRR-invalids, even
though IRRs are the older technology and are currently consid-
ered as the goto-solution. The fear of many network-operators
of losing routes by implementing ROV seems unaccounted for.
Despite the clear advantages of RPKI over IRR-based
filtering, the adoption of active ROV seems to be performed
rather hesitantly, since only about 1.4 % of networks seen by
RIPE-Atlas filtered our invalid announcements. As we see
from the results, big transit-providers have the most impact
when deploying ROV as they implicitly cover and protect their
customers. We have seen that 1.4 % filtering networks results
in about 6 % of coverage for the whole Internet.
On the positive side, many big Tier 1 networks already
announced the deployment of ROV, some of them are in the
process of deploying ROV on all customer-links (Telia), others
are already productive (Hurricane Electric). Not only is RPKI
a viable alternative to IRR-based filtering, it is far superior.
With this work, we clearly showed that RPKI is a substantial
enhancement over IRR in terms of data quality, that deploy-
ment is gaining traction even though large-scale coverage will
still take years, but that active ROV based on RPKI ROAs
starts to get deployed.
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